Spatial certainty : Feeling is the truth by Deroy, Ophelia & Fairhurst, Merle
Spatial certainty: Feeling is the truth 




Doubting Thomas, the biblical figure who could 
not be content with the mere vision of Jesus after 
his resurrection and asked to touch him, points 
toward a seldom-discussed privilege granted to 
touch over vision. Can we indeed identify such a 
privilege, and what does it amount to?  
In the first part of the chapter, we show that the 
privilege granted to touch becomes puzzling once 
considered as a comparative and epistemic 
superiority, that is as touch being considered as 
more informative than vision although the two 
modal i t ies provide s imi lar ly accurate 
information about the same properties, as it can 
happen for the existence as well as the spatial 
properties of mid-size objects. We show that this 
situation of equal accuracy, though difficult to 
assess in real-life situations, is not a mere ideal, as 
it can be implemented in laboratory settings. In a 
second part, we discuss the interpretations of this 
comparative tactile superiority.  
Previous philosophical accounts tend to explain the 
privilege granted to the sense of touch for both 
existence and space at the level of perception itself,  
seeing it as more ‘objective’ or more directly in 
contact with reality. The novel account proposed 
here suggests that touch offers not a perceptual, but 
a metacognitive advantage: touch is not more 
objective than vision but rather provides 
comparatively higher subjective certainty.  
The paper develops this account in three directions. 
First, we argue that conceptually, if not practically, 
we should distinguish two ways in which touch 
offers more subjective certainty than vision: one, 
which we call ‘existential certainty’, concerns the 
beliefs in the existence of their object, the other, 
which we call ‘spatial certainty’, concerns 
decisions about the spatial properties of objects. 
Second, we question whether this heightened 
certainty occurs across all cases, or more 
selectively, in particularly ambiguous or 
problematic cases. Finally, we consider candidate 
explanations of this metacognitive bias, coming 
from the r ichness, act ive character and 
developmental primacy of touch.  
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“Seeing is believing, but feeling is the truth” 
Thomas Fueller. 
“Art thou not, fatal vision, sensible 
To feeling as to sight? “ 
Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act II, scene 1 
We often forget that the proverb ‘seeing is 
believing’, originally from Thomas Fueller, is 
cited with an important concession: ‘Seeing is 
believing’ indeed, ‘but feeling is the truth’. 
Accepting that Fueller had in mind our sense of 
touch, rather than our hearts, he seems to 
remind us that when it comes to checking 
things in the world, touch seems to occupy a 
special role. It is the sense we turn to, like 
Macbeth, as if it offered a better grasp on 
objects or their properties than vision could. 
But why do we grant this privilege to touch? 
What does touch bring, that vision does not?   
Macbeth’s appeal to touch comes as a way of 
ascertaining whether the dagger that has 
appeared in front of him is special. The 
hallucinatory nature of his experience however, 
makes this case special. For disjunctivists, 
certainly, the hallucinatory nature of the king’s 
experience is sufficient to make the case non-
representative of perception. Disjunctivists 
indeed hold that perception and hallucination 
are separate kinds of states, and that the 
epistemic status of one does not compare to the 
other. To quote Paul Snowdon, “the experience 
in a genuinely perceptual case has a different 
nature to the experience involved in a non-
perceptual case. (....) The experience in the 
perceptual case in its nature reaches out to and 
involves the perceived external object, not so 
the experience in other cases.” (Snowdon 
2005). Even for non-disjunctivists, who would 
concede that what Macbeth is seeing is a form 
of distorted perception, the perceptual evidence 
which the new king is getting from vision is 
likely to be poor or problematic in several 
ways. First, the visual properties that he would 
expect from a dagger, or from a genuine visual 
experience, are likely to be of poor quality, 
either because they are degraded, unstable, or 
ambiguous. What is more, the properties that 
the dagger appears to have might remain 
highly surprising given Macbeth’s prior 
knowledge about daggers, and how they look: 
For instance, with the prior that daggers do not 
appear suddenly, or float in the air. If Macbeth 
turns to touch to get further, and better, sensory 
evidence, it is difficult to say whether this is 
because of a privilege of tactile evidence, or 
because of the paucity of the visual one.   
It would be impossible to compare vision and 
touch in domains where one or the other 
provided special access, as it is the case for 
example for colour for vision or temperature 
for touch. Additionally, some common 
sensibles such as texture, or types of material 
might also not be the best candidates, as touch 
here seems to be better than vision in giving us 
fine-grain information: we are for instance 
unable to reliably distinguish glass from 
transparent polymethyl methacrylate (PMMA) 
plastic by vision, but can do so by touch 
(Gueorguiev et al. 2016). Although the surfaces 
are both absolutely flat and do not differ 
beyond a few tens of nanometres, the 
difference in their molecular structure is 
sufficient to produce differences in the 
coeff icient of fr ict ion during tact i le 
exploration, making us above chance to 
distinguish the two surfaces. Similarly, from 
the developmental literature, one finds 
examples of tactile fact checking where young 
children were observed to use touch to identify 
t h e " r e a l " ( m a t e r i a l ) p r o p e r t i e s o f 
objects(Flavell, Flavell, and Green 1983; 
Flavell, Green, and Flavell 1986).  
We can, however, turn to other cases where 
touch still appears to have a special 
comparative advantage, even though vision is 
not degraded and provides good perceptual 
evidence. To make this comparison fair, it is 
necessary to select a domain where the two 
modalities are equally or comparably suited to 
the discrimination of the relevant perceptual 
property - which is the case with the perception 
of the spatial properties of middle-sized 
objects. Independently of the thorny question, 
raised by Molyneux (Locke, 1688, 1694), of 
the relation or identity between seen and 
touched shapes, there is little doubt that the 
two modalities provide us with information 
about the shape and size of material objects, 
with a possibly equal level of accuracy.  Spatial 
properties, like shape or length, offer a fairer 
comparison between touch and vision, as the 
two modalities allow for comparable levels of 
discriminative performance if the object in 
question can be easily explored by touch. For 
example, if presented with two matches, in 
good illumination conditions, one of 2 cm, and 
the other of 2.5 cm, most of us will be able to 
visually and tactually perceive them as unequal 
in length. In this he test-case we narrow the 
question: Although both touch and vision are 
equally reliable in providing perceptual 
evidence about length, does touch offer more 
trustworthy evidence of length than vision? 
There is good evidence to suggest that touch is 
granted such a superiority over vision (part 2), 
even in cases which are not analysable as being 
different in terms of accuracy. Previous 
accounts tend to situate the privilege of touch 
at the level of perception itself, interpreting 
touch as being more ‘objective’ or offering 
more direct contact with reality (part 3). The 
novel account proposed here suggests that 
touch offers not a perceptual, but a 
metacognitive advantage: touch is not more 
objective than vision but provides a 
comparatively higher subjective certainty (part 
4).   
2.Establishing the comparative privilege 
granted to touch    
2.1. Tactile fact checking: A widespread, and 
confusing phenomenon 
Everyday experience shows that touch is the 
‘fact-checking’ sense par excellence (Bremner 
and Spence 2017). We all like to feel for our 
keys or wallets in our bags, even if we just saw 
that we put them there. Despite numerous signs 
asking visitors not to touch the artworks on 
display, guards need to regularly stop people 
from reaching out and touching fragile statues 
and canvasses. The privilege of touch is also 
well-known to salesmen: If a client hesitates to 
buy a product, handing it over for her to touch 
is likely to seal the deal. A study conducted by 
Peck & Childers (2006) for instance shows that 
people are more likely to buy a product that 
they are encouraged to touch (Peck and 
Childers 2006). Müller (2013) showed that the 
boosting effect of touch is largely independent 
from its informativeness about the product’s 
quality: touching the package of an object, or 
even a picture of an object is sufficient to 
significantly increase purchasing behaviour 
(Müller 2013). 
These everyday cases show how difficult it is 
to apply the distinction we draw between 
unique access, and distinctive and equal 
reliability. In most of the cases detailed above, 
touch provides unique perceptual information 
that vision does not (for instance, about the 
weight of the product that one is interested in); 
it also often provides distinctively better 
information about certain common sensibles it 
shares with vision (for instance, the texture of 
clothes); finally, it probably also provides 
equally good evidence about some spatial 
properties like size. This combination makes it 
difficult to say where the privilege granted to 
touch comes from and assess its rationality. If 
we turn to touch for its unique access to the 
weight of the object or better evidence about 
the texture of an item of clothing, it would 
hardly be surprising that we would trust touch 
more than vision. It is only in the cases where 
vision already provides sufficient information 
for the perceiver’s belief or decision, and yet 
still prompts people to fact-check by touch 
rather than just relying on vision, that the 
privilege cannot be immediately explained.  
2.2. Comparative tactile fact-checking  
The surprising fact is not that touch is relied 
upon when it provides information about a 
unique physical property, or better information 
than vision: The surprising fact is that touch is 
called upon when it provides information 
which is neither better nor different from 
vision. A famous, albeit literary example here, 
is the biblical story of doubting Thomas: 
Thomas had to touch Christ’s wounds to be 
convinced the person in front of him was Jesus. 
The story here tells us something important. 
Touching ‘to be sure’ is especially relevant 
when our other senses or beliefs create a 
situation of high uncertainty, in this case, 
because the information conveyed by the other 
senses (vision) generates doubt and conflicts 
with prior knowledge. Individuals with 
obsessive compulsive disorder keep touching 
the objects of their anxiety, even though they 
can look at them: They return to turn off the 
tap, even when they can see or hear that no 
water is dripping (Samuels et al. 2017 for 
overview). Both cases are however difficult to 
interpret: one, after all, comes from a narrative, 
while the other is a general clinical observation 
which covers many different cases, and 
circumstances. They are certainly not evidence, 
but invitations to consider the plausibility of a 
comparative privilege granted to touch, when 
vision does equally well. 
We need here to distinguish between two 
properties that might be equally well accessed 
by the sense of touch and vision: One is the 
existence of the object; the other, are its spatial 
properties, such as its extension, size, or shape.   
The first claim, which is also the most 
discussed in the classical philosophical 
l i t e r a tu r e , r e cogn i se s t ha t t ouch i s 
comparatively better than vision in checking 
facts relative to the existence or reality of the 
perceived object:  
Existential tactile superiority (Existence-TS): 
Touch is more reliable than vision when it 
comes to providing perceptual evidence about 
the existence of an object.  
The famous example of Dr. Johnson comes 
easily to mind when it comes to this first claim: 
When he wanted to demonstrate the absurdity 
of Berkeley’s idea that material objects did not 
exist, or so the anecdote reports, Johnson 
ostensively kicked his foot against a large 
stone, and triumphantly asserted "I refute it 
thus." What is relevant to our point here is that 
Johnson felt that pointing at the coloured shape 
of the stone, which everyone could see, was 
not sufficient: vision would not demonstrate 
the existence of the external world as well as 
touch would. The resistance of solid objects 
through touch is meant to provide us with the 
experience that there are things out there, 
independent of us and our will (see Fulkerson 
2014; Massin 2010 for reviews). 
A different claim, not directly relevant to 
Johnson but important to us, is that touch could 
be comparatively better than vision in checking 
facts relative, not to the existence or reality of 
the perceived object, to the spatial properties of 
the object, such as its size, or shape .     1
Spatial tactile superiority (Space-TS): Touch is 
more reliable than vision when it comes to 
providing perceptual evidence about the spatial 
properties of objects such as size and shape.  
Note that the two claims are delicate to 
disentangle in a single case: The concept of 
tangibility, which is often used to characterise 
evidence, often runs together with the idea of 
material existence and of spatial extension. 
Bundled together, it could be that touch is the 
only sense to give us access to tangible 
property, that is both to the material existence 
and the spatial properties of material objects - 
in which case, one could argue that tangible 
 Note that texture also count as a spatial property of the surface, but at a smaller scale - as noted above, touch often 1
provides better evidence than vision about texture, and it is not counted here.
properties are the proper sensibles of touch. If 
tangible properties are uniquely accessible to 
touch, and inaccessible to vision, then we are 
back to a case where it does not make sense to 
talk of a comparative privilege granted to 
touch, but simply that it offers information that 
is not accessible to the other senses.   
The fact that we don’t speak about the same 
thing when we consider tactile access to the 
existence of the object, and tactile access to the 
spatial properties of the objects can be 
defended on both conceptual and empirical 
grounds. Conceptually, judgements of 
existence are indeed binary: They have to 
determine whether something exists or not, and 
there is no intermediary where something 
semi-exists. By contrast, judgements about 
spatial properties accept many values: An 
object can be square, rectangular, circular, 
elliptical, pentagonal, etc. Its side can be 1, 2, 3 
or more centimetres long, with intermediate 
values. When looking at tactile superiority 
then, it makes sense to ask whether touch is 
better than vision in a binary ‘existential’ task 
(does this exist, or not?) or a estimation task 
with many more values (‘how long is this?). 
Cast in empirical terms, one could distinguish 
the superiority of touch in respective detection 
(existence) or discrimination (space) tasks.      
From an empirical perspective, there are many 
cases where our perception of spatial properties 
by touch can be dissociated from the 
perception of the existence or materiality of the 
object: When we explore a virtual tactile 
object, for instance, we might know and 
perceive that there is no real material object 
that we are exploring, and still be able to 
perceive some spatial properties, like shape . A 
similar dissociation might be obtained when an 
object is placed in our hand, without leading to 
friction   and as such certain properties derived 
through active exploration. In the first case, we 
have tactile information about the length or 
shape of the object, but the material existence 
of the object itself is (assumedly) not part of 
our perception. In the second case, we have 
access to the size or length of the object (as 
well as its location) but not to its other material 
properties. Another, subtler, case which will be 
relevant below, comes from tactile spatial 
illusion literature: In the tactile version of the 
illusion known as the Vertical-Horizontal, 
when one explores an inverted T-shape by 
touch, the vertical bar appears to be longer than 
the adjoining horizontal bar of equal length 
fitted at its intersection (see Fig. 1a). The same 
bar would be perceived equal in size to the 
other bar, if the two in a different spatial 
configuration (Fig. 1b). Here the two 
perceptions, when the bars shape an inverted T, 
and when the bars are parallel, do not differ in 
terms of the information provided about the 
existence of the bars, but only in terms of the 
information provided about the relative size of 
the bars.  
!
!  
Figure 1. Vertical-Horizontal 
illusion. (A) Bars of equal length 
arranged in an inverted T-shape 
lead to overestimations of the 
relative length of the vertical bar 
while in (B) arranged in parallel, no 
difference in length will be 
observed.  
We will only come back at the end to the 
possible relation between the existential and 
the spatial superiority granted to touch over 
vision, but first we turn to the broader question 
of how they should be interpreted. 
3. Touch and objectivity: The traditional 
response 
Existing philosophical accounts have mostly 
focused on the existential superiority of touch, 
usually by considering that the special 
character of touch comes from its direct 
contact with the material reality, and its 
resistance to the force we exert onto it. This, 
certainly, is what Johnson had in mind with his 
ad-lapidem argument. There is nothing wrong 
with choosing this line, apparently, except that 
it is not really supporting the superiority of 
touch: If material resistance is something that 
touch uniquely accesses, then we cannot talk of 
a comparative, but only of an exclusive 
privilege. If vision cannot even compete, touch 
should indeed reign.  
The ‘direct contact’ views, moreover, do not 
have much to say about the alternative claim, 
namely the question of spatial superiority. The 
extension of the argument here would be that 
touch as a purely proximal senses provides us 
with ‘direct contact’ with the spatial properties 
of the object, and for that reason, is better than 
vision which provides has less direct contact 
with the same properties. The argument is not 
altogether bad, and it might explain why touch 
is distinctively better when it comes to texture: 
the need for direct exploration of the surface in 
the case of touch means that it can derive 
subtle spatial information from active touch 
and friction, and the deformation of the 
fingertip, which is not the case for vision. 
Touch, here, has literally more skin in the game 
as a contact sense, and is distinctively better 
than vision. However, in the case of size and 
shape, the argument that touch gives us more 
direct access to spatial properties is difficult to 
reconcile with what is known about the sense 
of touch.  
If by direct, it is meant that the process of 
deriving spatial information is less inferential 
or mediated than the processing of visual 
information, the argument certainly fails. 
Tactile processing is highly mediated, and rests 
on expectations and unconscious inferences, no 
less than the other senses. If by direct, it is 
meant that the experience of touching an object 
feels more un-mediated than the experience of 
seeing the same object, the claim may be more 
plausible, but certainly does not turn into an 
argument for the object of that experience to be 
especially objective, once pushed beyond the 
fact that they are perceived as mind-
independent. There is no particular reason to 
translate the experienced direct contact into the 
perception being more reliable in estimating 
spatial properties. Touch is at least as easily 
deceived as the other senses and as such is 
equally subject to illusions and hallucinations 
as vision (see Hayward 2008 for overview). We 
just don’t hear about them that often. To take 
just one example, many people are surprised to 
learn that the button on their phones does not 
really move when pressed: The impression that 
it does is created by a vibration, which fools 
the brain into inferring that something was 
pressed. Switch off the phone and repeat the 
action, and you will realise that the surface 
cannot be moved at all (see also Terekhov and 
Hayward 2015). 
When it comes to providing evidence about 
spatial features like size or shape, rather than 
the existence, or even texture of material 
objects, the claim cannot be that touch can 
provide more objective or more accurate 
perceptual information than vision, since the 
relative accuracy of the two modalities depends 
critically on the context and difficulty of the 
task. Whether it provides more accurate 
information than vision, say on an object’s 
shape, or size, depends on the circumstances of 
sensing. Sometimes touch is better; sometimes 
vision is. If touch has no general advantage 
over vision in the perception of spatial 
properties, such as size, what privilege is left to 
make sense of a spatial tactile superiority? 
4. Tactile certainty: A metacognitive account  
An alternative way of understanding the 
anecdotal reliance on touch is then that, for 
equal accuracy and for the same object or 
property, people might place more confidence 
in decisions reached by touch rather than 
vision. According to the present proposal, the 
special privilege of touch does not come from 
perception or perceptual judgements, but from 
the subjective certainty that this sense modality 
provides.  
A first argument for this proposal comes from 
experience. An important aspect of touch, often 
missed when insisting on accuracy alone, is 
that touching is more psychologically 
reassuring than seeing. Touch does not always 
make us experience things better, but it 
certainly makes us feel better about what we 
experience. Even when we can see that the 
keys are in our bag, we are much more certain 
that they are, once we’ve touched them. What 
might seem almost superstitious at first could 
however have deeper reasons. The assurance 
that touch gives us makes it rather special in 
our epistemic life. Descartes came close to this 
diagnosis when he noted that the evidence we 
got from touch was somewhat harder to 
discard: “Of all our senses”, he commented 
“touch is the one considered least deceptive 
and the most secure” (Descartes 1633). The 
phenomenological argument is especially 
adequate to capture the secure feeling of the 
reality or presence of an object provided by 
touch. Feeling of presences are documented in 
the literature in connection with various 
pathologies were their defect causes 
individuals to feel that certain objects or 
individuals are not real. They are also 
documented in connection with virtual reality, 
where scenes and objects can be reproduced 
with high fidelity, but still “lack” reality. What 
the metacognitive account we are proposing 
adds here is the idea that feelings of presence 
(e.g. Lee 2004; Sanchez-Vives and Slater 
2005) or reality vary depending on the sensory 
modality : According the metacognitive 2
account, the feeling of certainty that touch 
gives that an object is really present is higher, 
though not more accurate, than the certainty 
provided by vision. Here, the metacognitive 
account recommends a revision of the previous 
claim: 
Existential tactile superiority (Existence-TS): 
Touch is more reliable than vision when it 
comes to providing perceptual evidence about 
the existence of an object. 
in favour of a second one: 
Existential tactile metacognitive superiority 
(Existence-Metacognitive-TS): Touch is 
subjectively rated as more certain than vision 
when it comes to providing perceptual evidence 
about the reality and existence of its objects, 
for an equal level of objective accuracy. 
How about the second superiority claim, which 
relates to space? Is there also evidence of a 
heightened certainty when we estimate spatial 
properties by touch rather than vision, such that 
the spatial tactile superiority, instead of being 
stated as: 
Spatial tactile superiority (Space-TS): Touch is 
more reliable than vision when it comes to 
providing perceptual evidence about the spatial 
properties of objects. 
is revised as: 
Spatial tactile metacognitive superiority 
(Space -Me tacogn i t i ve -TS) : Touch i s 
subjectively rated as more reliable than vision 
when it comes to providing perceptual evidence 
about the spatial properties of objects, for an 
equal level of objective accuracy. 
In a recent experiment, Fairhurst et al. (under 
review) provide evidence for the existence of 
such a metacognitive advantage given to touch, 
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when it comes to spatial estimates of size. 
Observers explored versions of the inverted T’s 
described above as the Vertical-Horizontal 
illusion. In the illusion, the vertical bar of the T 
is perceived as longer than its real size and 
increased by approximately 1/10th. The 
illusion works both in touch and vision, and in 
the experiment, these two modalities were 
used, one to the exclusion of the other: When 
exploring the stimuli by touch, participants 
were asked to close their eyes, and only 
explore the object by touch, through two 
swipes. When seeing the stimuli, they could 
simply watch them but could not touch them. 
The task, in both cases, was to determine 
whether the vertical bar was shorter or longer 
than the horizontal bar. The size of the 
horizontal bar did not vary, but the size of the 
vertical bar varied, making the comparison 
with the horizontal bar either clear-cut or on 
the contrary ambiguous. 
What matters in the study however was not the 
objective accuracy of the perceptual estimates, 
was expected to be relatively poor given the 
illusion. What the study looked at was the 
confidence that participants reported about 
each of their decisions, both in touch and 
vision.  
This psychophysical study of perceptual 
confidence arises from a set of new results on 
metacognitive abilities, showing how the 
cognitive system assesses and monitors its own 
states. Numerous studies have shown that the 
confidence that we put in our perceptual 
decisions is more or less tracking the accuracy 
of these decisions: We are more confident in 
decisions that are more likely to be correct, and 
less confident in decisions that are less likely to 
be accurate.  
By asking participants to report their 
confidence both for visual and tactile 
decisions, the study we conducted could tell us 
whether, for a similarly ambiguous or clear 
case, touch would be more trusted than vision. 
It is worth stopping to consider why this 
hypothesis is unexpected. Most of the studies 
of perceptual certainty have looked at vision, 
but a few others have considered audition, or, 
less frequently, touch. When they have, they 
have found that confidence seems to operate in 
similar ways across senses, which makes sense 
in a multisensory world. As we will often 
encounter and explore objects through our 
various senses, and we need to know which 
sense (and evidence) to trust. If confidence is 
to allow the reliability of different percepts to 
be compared, and appropriate trust to be placed 
in each accordingly. If confidence tracks 
accuracy in a consistent manner across 
modalities, and decisional correctness, then the 
hypothesis of a tactile metacognitive 
superiority would not hold (Figure 2, left). By 
contrast, if the metacognitive hypothesis holds, 
we would expect that people would be overall 
more certain of what they touch, rather than 
what they see, in cases where they are similarly 
correct (or rather incorrect). If this holds, then 
we would be right to attribute a generalised 
over-confidence in favour of touch (Figure 2, 
middle).  
What the results show however is more 
specific. On the one hand, and contrary to the 
common currency model, confidence did not 
operate in similar ways in the two modalities. 
However, people were not always more 
confident in their tactile decisions: Overall 
participants were more confident in vision, 
which was altogether more accurate, and 
showed higher perceptual sensitivity. The bias 
in favour of touch surfaced when cases were 
highly ambiguous, that is around the maximal 
point of illusion. While touch was still less 
accurate than vision in such cases, it was rated 
as providing more subjective certainty than 
vision. In what we can call a “Doubting 
Thomas effect”, it is shown that observers are 
more confidence when exploring the spatial 
properties of an object by touch rather than 
vision, not in a general, but in a selective way 
(Figure 2, right)  
For lack of many other studies comparing 
metacognition in touch and vision (though see 
Faivre et al. 2017), or addressing the 
crossmodal and multisensory interactions 
between touch and vision (see Deroy, Spence, 
and Noppeney 2016 for discussion), it is 
d i f f i c u l t t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e 
metacognitive tactile superiority exists also 
extends in other cases. If it does, it also 
remains to be determined whether this 
superiority will be this time general, showing 
that touch is always more trusted than vision in 
the task, or selective, showing that touch is 
trusted more than vision only when difficulty 
or ambiguity are high. What this first 
comparative study does, at least, is provide an 
interesting nuance to the spatial tactile 
metacognitive superiority claim, such that:   
Selective Spatial tactile metacognitive 
superiority (Selective-Space-Metacognitive-
TS): Touch is subjectively rated as more 
reliable than vision when it comes to providing 
perceptual evidence about the spatial 
properties of objects, when both modalities are 
faced with ambiguous evidence, and despite 
what an appropriate tracking of objective 
accuracy would prescribe. 
In other and simpler words, we have evidence 
that touch is more trusted, even when it is not 
more accurate, when estimating the spatial 
properties of objects in challenging situations. 
We also have grounds to think that the 
metacognitive account bears some truth.  
5. Why do we comparatively trust touch 
more? 
A bias in our reliance to tactile evidence may 
therefore be described as either task dependent 
or dependent of on a level of uncertainty. How 
are these cases perceptually related (if at all)? 
Touch may be providing something the other 
senses don’t either because it is simply better 
suited to deriving information about additional 
physical properties. If this is the case, this 
additional information may resolve conflict or 
ambiguity. What is it that touch is adding to 
overcome conflict or uncertainty? Additionally, 
does the potential for deriving this additional 
information become relied upon or influence 
and explain our more general reliance on 
touch?  
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Figure 2 . Confidence across 
modalities. For the same level of 
d i s c r i m i n a t i v e p e r f o r m a n c e 
(Probability (P) correct), touch (red) 
and vision (blue) may be equally 
trusted (left). Alternatively, one might 
observe a either a global (middle) or 
selective (right) overconfidence in 
touch relative to vision. 
Why would touch bring us more certainty? 
Two questions can emerge here, depending on 
whether we think that the tactile metacognitive 
superiority is selective, and occurs especially 
in challenging cases, or general (Figure 2). The 
two require more examination, and careful 
investigation.  
However, the presence of any of these 
confidence biases is challenging for the way 
we normatively think about confidence: Our 
ratings of certainty should track correctness, so 
that cases where we trust touch more than 
vision should be the ones where touching 
provides more accurate information than 
looking (see Fleming and Daw 2017; Morrison 
2017 for overviews, see Navajas, Bahrami, and 
Latham 2016; Navajas et al. 2017 for 
discussion of these normative assumptions). 
But this is not what explains the results of the 
experiment by Fairhurst and colleagues 
presented above. Nor do they explain, more 
broadly, the attitude of Thomas, or obsessive 
compulsive disorder patients.  
The reasons why touch brings us reassurance 
and certainty might run deep into what more 
broadly constitutes our subjective feelings of 
confidence. Perhaps we trust touch more 
because we feel more active and in charge 
when we explore something by touch than 
through vision(Gibson 1962). This is a 
subjective impression, as we also actively 
move our eyes when we see, but the fact that 
we move our hands across surfaces might 
explain why we are also more confident in 
what we touch: We believe that we have 
actively collected and sampled the evidence, 
rather than passively received it. Feeling we 
have ‘done this ourselves’, we are more certain 
that it is reliable.  
Beyond subjective feelings of trust being the 
more secure sense, an action-based account 
finds some grounding in empirical work 
(Fleming and Daw 2017; Pouget, Drugowitsch, 
and Kepecs 2016). Confidence in perceptual 
tasks has been shown to be disrupted when 
movement speed is manipulated (Palser, 
Fotopoulou, and Kilner 2018) as well as by 
transcranial magnetic stimulation of the motor 
system (Fleming et al. 2015). Additionally, in 
as yet unplublished data, Gajdos and 
colleagues recorded preparatory motor activity 
using EMG to show how the motor 
components impacts confidence ratings, over 
and above performance (Massoni, Gajdos, and 
Vergnaud 2014). This action-based proposal 
and evidence supporting it would explain a 
general metacognitive bias toward touch. It 
would however not explain the selective nature 
of the bias observed by Fairhurst and 
colleagues.: there, participants actively 
explored through touch all stimuli but tactile 
evidence was only trusted more to resolve high 
levels of conflict in the highly ambiguous 
cases. 
An alternative or additional explanation in 
terms of affective reassurance can take better 
care of both kinds of biases. We may think we 
are reaching for better information when we 
touch the visible objects around us, but perhaps 
we are simply betraying a basic need for 
reassurance. Here the evaluative dimension 
attached to touch, which co-occurs with the 
discriminative capacities of touch (McGlone, 
Wessberg, and Olausson 2014). could be 
responsible for this bias, and eventually show 
more in cases where doubt surfaces.   
A further developmental account may rest in 
the primacy of touch in human development. 
Wi t h t h e m a t u r a t i o n o f c u t a n e o u s 
somatosensory receptors at 4-7 weeks gestation 
(Humphrey 1964), the tactile system shows 
precedence over vision and hearing (Bremner 
and Spence 2017). Moreover, and more 
specific to the case of object and indeed spatial 
perception, hand to mouth object transport 
precedes, if only marginally, that of visually 
guided reaching (Piaget 1953) and thus has 
been described as the first goal-directed action 
(Rochat and Senders 1991). Interestingly, this 
fundamental skill, observed so early in human 
development in this simple case of oral haptic 
touch, has been said to show the elementary 
features of intentionality (Butterworth and 
H o p k i n s 1 9 8 8 ) . A d d i t i o n a l l y, a s a 
contemporary update on classical theories that 
touch informs the other senses (Teske 1977), 
with touch established early on, Bremner and 
Spence suggest that touch may then serve as 
“the sensory scaffold upon which multisensory 
p e r c e p t u a l d e v e l o p m e n t i s 
constructed” (Bremner and Spence 2017). 
Finally, it could be that the metacognitive 
superiority is simply due to the heightened 
certainty, or special access that we derive from 
touch about the existence of the external 
object. Those indirect cases would show that 
confidence placed in a spatial discrimination 
task could be influenced by the estimates or the 
confidence relative to another task (detection, 
or certainty of existence). We know from 
several studies (Bahrami et al. 2010; Fleming 
et al. 2010) how metacognition operates in a 
detection task, but still ignore what would 
happen in the case of touch. Whether detection 
is a good proxy for the judgement of reality 
talked about by modern philosophers, is also 
another question for discussion. However, the 
hypothesis that confidence could be influenced 
by other signals finds supportive evidence in 
the literature (Allen et al. 2016) and has been 
linked to the modulation of the influence of 
noise on confidence. The idea of a confidence 
“halo”, where confidence in one task is 
influenced by the confidence put in another, 
automatic task, remains open. 
7. Conclusions: Confidence in spatial 
perception, and questions for awareness.  
The present account shows how important it 
can be to reflect not just on the perception of 
space, but on the subjective certainty we place 
in our perception of spatial properties. Touch 
might well make us more certain of the size of 
the match we touch, than vision would, even 
though it is not better. In this paper, we framed 
the hypothesis as a metacognitive tactile 
superiority, and discussed its generality, 
selectivity and possible indirect origins.  
Importantly, metacognitive ratings of 
confidence may also be translated into ratings 
of various feelings, as well as vividness, and 
considered as a good measure of awareness. 
This subjective feeling can be interpreted as 
linked to feelings of agency, or as a noetic 
feeling of certainty (conceptually, if not de 
facto distinct from the noetic feeling of reality 
(Dokic and Martin 2015) also eventually 
heightened in touch. It can also be interpreted 
at the level of perceptual content, for instance 
as what phenomenology would make us 
capture as a ‘clearer’ percept (Morrison 2017). 
Although these conscious manifestations are 
important to disentangle and document, the 
metacognitive superiority of touch, however 
does not require that they occur, or ground 
differences in confidence. As such, the present 
account welcomes the claim, but does imply 
that there is a phenomenal difference in our 
perception of the existence of objects or their 
spatial properties when we explore them by 
touch ra the r than v i s ion . What the 
metacognitive account requires is only that we 
manage to have access to a difference in 
confidence, and that this drives our decisions 
and actions, making us, like Doubting Thomas, 
reach for things we can see.    
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